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Abstract
Voting is one of the fundamental pillars of modern democracy. Continuous efforts have been made to strengthen the
processes and methods involved to achieve verifiable, transparent voting systems. In recent years, blockchain has been
increasingly used to address multi-dimensional challenges across widespread application domains including healthcare,
finance and e-voting. However, achieving an efficient solution via use of blockchain requires consideration of a range
of factors such as block generation rate, transaction speed, and block size which have a profound role in determining
the overall performance of the solution. Current research into this aspect of blockchain is focused on Bitcoin with the
objective to achieve comparable performance as of existing online payment systems such as VISA. However, there exists
a gap in literature with respect to investigating performance constraints for wider application domains. In this paper, we
present our efforts to address this gap by presenting a detailed study into performance and scalability constraints for an
e-voting system. Specifically, we conducted rigorous experimentation with permissioned and permissionless blockchain
settings across different scenarios with respect to voting population, block size, block generation rate and transaction
speed. The experiments highlighted interesting observations with respect to the impact of these parameters on the overall
efficiency and scalability of the e-voting model including trade-offs between different parameters as well as security and
performance.
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1. Introduction
Voting is one of the fundamental characteristics of hu-
man democracy with continuous efforts made throughout
human history to improve the processes, mechanisms and
methods involved to conduct voting in a verifiable, trans-
parent and accessible manner. The advent of Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT), has brought re-
newed emphasis on using ICT to facilitate voting processes
primarily to enable transparency and accessibility. Since
its first use as punched-card ballots in 1960s, e-voting sys-
tems have achieved remarkable progress via the internet
technologies [1] with a range of terminologies used such
as e-voting (using a machine in a polling station), digital
voting (use of electronic devices such as voting machines)
and i-voting (using web browser to cast vote). The focus
of our research is on using advancements in ICT via elec-
tronic machines in polling stations as part of a public vote
(commonly called General Election in the UK) with the
view of investigating challenges in this respect and poten-
tial solutions to address them.
Blockchain has attracted significant attention with promi-
nent applications across finance [2], healthcare [3] and sup-
ply chain management systems [4]. A Blockchain resem-
bles a data structure which maintains and shares all the
transactions being executed through its genesis. It is pri-
marily a distributed decentralized database that maintains
a complete list of constantly germinating and growing data
records secured from unauthorized manipulation, tamper-
ing and revision. Blockchain allows every user to connect
to the network, send new transactions to it, verify transac-
tions and create new blocks [5, 6, 7]. Each block is assigned
a cryptographic hash (which may also be treated as a fin-
gerprint of the block) that remains valid as long as the
data in the block is not altered. If any changes are made
in the block, the cryptographic hash would change imme-
diately indicating a change in the data which may be due
to a malicious activity. Therefore, due to its strong foun-
dations in cryptography, blockchain has been increasingly
used to mitigate against unauthorized transactions across
various domains [7, 8, 9].
Electronic voting (e-voting) is one of the emerging ap-
plications of blockchain whereby researchers aim to lever-
age benefits such as integrity, anonymity and non-repudiation
which are critical for a voting application. Use of blockchain
to facilitate e-voting applications has received significant
attention recently with efforts such as [10, 11, 12, 13] lever-
aging blockchain technology to achieve secure and veri-
fiable voting. Specifically, blockchain enables creating a
pool of voters by generating unique physical addresses
which can be used to represent the voter population and
the candidates. A single voting token may be issued to ev-
ery voter corresponding to their unique address thereby
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representing a unique voter. Similarly, some addresses
are reserved to identify candidates which may then be
used to transfer voting token from voters addresses. The
voting transaction generated by the voter contains the
transfer of voting token to his desired candidate as a re-
ceivers address. This transaction becomes part of the main
blockchain when confirmed into a block by one of the des-
ignated miners. The connected node to the seed node then
takes part in the data synchronization process to update
the public ledger of blockchain along with its local copy.
This process enables achieving strong non-repudiation for
the e-voting application as the record of the transaction
becomes immutable due to consensus protocol acknowl-
edged by all miners.
Whilst existing research has focused on leveraging ben-
efits of blockchain such as those highlighted above, efforts
with respect to in-depth investigation into challenges sur-
rounding scalability of blockchain based solutions are pri-
marily limited to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. For in-
stance, [14] is one of leading efforts to investigate scalabil-
ity constraints of Bitcoin where authors investigated prac-
tical limitations in achieving performance level expected
with respect to attributes including time required to mine
a transaction into the block of the longest blockchain, pro-
cessing rate for number of transactions, time required to
download and run a full copy of blockchain from scratch
in order to participate in the process of transaction vali-
dation, costs incurred due to purchasing, maintaining and
working of resources (such as electricity utilization). The
motivation for this and other similar research is the com-
parison with mainstream online payment system such as
VISA. Specifically, VISA can process up to 2000 transac-
tions per second whereas Bitcoin system is limited to 7
transactions per second primarily due to limits on block
generation rate and transaction processing speed [15, 16,
17].
However, wider applications of blockchain mentioned
earlier use platforms such as Ethereum [18] and Multichain
[19] that are fundamentally different from Bitcoin with re-
spect to factors such as block generation rate, consensus
algorithm, transaction process rate and block size. These
parameters have profound role in determining scalability
of a blockchain based solution. Furthermore, the through-
put of a blockchain based system not only depends upon
factors such as the capacity of infrastructure such as hash-
ing power and memory but also on the type of transactions
used within an application. Additionally, in scenarios such
as e-voting in public domain, large number of transactions
are expected to be recorded in blockchain concurrently.
Therefore, if the rate of incoming transactions to the un-
confirmed pool of transactions does not match to rate of
confirmation of transactions to the blocks by the miners,
it can result in significant performance overhead as well
as delays in transaction confirmation time. Consequently,
an in-depth investigation is required to identify and assess
challenges with respect to scalability for wider application
domains such as the one considered in this paper.
In view of the above challenges, we conducted a thor-
ough investigation into the challenges surrounding scal-
ability of blockchain based applications in general and
blockchain based e-voting applications in particular. Our
investigation includes experimentation with a blockchain
test-bed hosting an e-voting application focusing on va-
riety of scenarios across permissioned and permissionless
blockchain settings. Permissionless setting simulates envi-
ronments with smaller number of users adopting a public
blockchain with experimentation varying with respect to
level of difficulty to mine a block, the block-size and aver-
age block creation time. These experiments reveal signif-
icant trade-off between transaction block size, block gen-
eration rate, and transaction processing speed. Further-
more, scenarios with permissioned blockchain aim to sim-
ulate e-voting environments with large number of voters
such as public voting systems. The experimentation in-
volves evaluation of the system with respect to the volume
of transactions as well as the number of remote client vot-
ing machines operating from different network locations to
observe impact of such constraints on the overall perfor-
mance of a blockchain based system.
We present the findings from our investigation in this
paper with the aim to aid research community to un-
derstand the caveats with respect to achieving scalable
blockchain based solutions as well as expanding new hori-
zons in this respect. Consequently, through our investiga-
tion, we are able to provide a rigorous assessment of the
capability of the underlying blockchain fabric and iden-
tify potential trade-offs required to achieve desired level of
performance. Specifically, the paper makes the following
contributions:
• A thorough investigation is performed aimed at iden-
tifying and highlighting significance of parameters
such as block size, block generation rate and trans-
action processing speed to achieve scalable solutions
using blockchain technology.
• Rigorous experimentation is conducted which aims
to identify and highlight performance constraints for
both permissioned and permissionless blockchain set-
tings which can potentially aid researchers in wide
range of application domains.
• A novel blockchain based e-voting system is pre-
sented which investigates the capabilities of blockchain
technology to achieve e-voting for permissioned and
permissionless voting models.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents a background for e-voting systems providing im-
portant context to cutting edge research within this do-
main. Section 3 presents a summary of existing work with
respect to scalability research within blockchain identify-
ing the gap addressed by this research. Section 4 presents
an overview of the proposed e-voting system followed by
details of implementation and experimentation in section
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5 which also includes details of different scenarios and an
analysis of results observed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Electronic Voting
Electronic voting has been an area of research focus
for many years by using computing machines and equip-
ment to cast votes and produce high quality and precise
results in accordance with the sentiments of the participat-
ing voters. Various attempts have been adopted in prac-
tice to support election process through the use of ICT.
One of the first uses of technology involved casting vote
on paper which were scanned and tallied at every polling
cell on a central server [6, 20, 21]. Direct Recording Elec-
tronic (DRE) voting systems were adopted later and have
attracted significant success in encouraging voters to use
this technology. In the case of DRE, voters begin their
journey by going to their polling place and get their to-
ken to vote where they utilize their token at the voting
terminal to vote for their preferred candidate. When the
candidate selection procedure is completed, DRE systems
present the final selection to the voter before ballot casting
is completed [22].
More recently, Hao et al. [21] proposed a two round
protocol that computes the tally in two rounds without
using a private channel or a trusted third party. The pro-
tocol is efficient in terms of computation and bandwidth
consumption but is neither robust nor fair in certain con-
ditions [22]. Dalia et al. [22] proposed a protocol to im-
prove the robustness and fairness of the two round pro-
tocol. Shahandashti et al. [23] proposed E2E verifiable
voting system named DRE-ip (DRE-i with enhanced pri-
vacy), that overcomes limitations of DRE-i [24] i.e. in-
stead of pre-computing ciphertexts, DRE-ip encrypts the
vote on the fly during voting process. DRE-ip achieves
E2E verifiability without TAs, but at the same time pro-
vides a significantly stronger privacy guarantee than DRE-
i. In [25], end-to-end verifiability is achieved through the
Mixnet protocol [26] that recovers the plaintext ballot in
an unlinkable manner by randomizing the ciphertext through
a chain of mix servers. These approaches perform well for
end-to-end verifiability without compromising k0the pri-
vacy of voters.
An e-voting system may be broadly classified into two
types facilitating; i) remote user interaction and ii) voting
station engagement.
Remote user interaction: This model facilitates a voter
to vote from any remote location utilizing a pre-verified
identity such as a card or login credentials. Consequently,
a person can vote from their home using their smartphone
or computer to register to vote using a software or a web
application. This voting model relies on cutting edge tech-
nological advancements to provide secure and easy method
to use alternative to traditional voting system thereby
helping to reduce human errors. Furthermore, voters can
be provided a feedback that their vote is counted thereby
improving the trust of the voter as well as verifiability and
non-repudiation. A number of initiatives in this regard
have been adopted indicating challenges with respect to
security and correctness of the vote such as those identi-
fied by [27, 28].
Voting station engagement: This e-voting model in-
cludes scenarios where a voter can vote through a polling
station where electronic voting systems such as DRE are
deployed to facilitate the voting process. Typically, such
machines are connected to the Internet to aid the overall
voting process. A major advantage of DRE machines is
the significant reduction in the cost as it avoids using bal-
lot papers. A number of initiatives have been adopted by
different governments across the world to implement such
e-voting model such as Estonian i-vote system [29] and
Norwegian i-voting [30]. However a number of security
challenges were identified to achieve transparent and veri-
fiable execution of these systems such as those highlighted
in [31].
More recently, distributed ledger technologies such as
blockchain have been used to achieve e-voting systems pri-
marily due to their advantages in terms of end-to-end ver-
ifiability. With properties such as anonymity, privacy pro-
tection and non-repudiation, blockchain is a very attrac-
tive alternative to contemporary e-voting systems and has
been used both for boardroom voting as well as public vot-
ing (focus of this paper). Within this context, McCorry
et al. [32] proposed one of the early efforts for imple-
mentation of decentralized and self-tallying internet voting
protocol over Ethereum blockchain using openvote [24] e-
voting approach as their baseline. Khan et al. in [33]
proposed a more recent secure digital voting system using
blockchain with Prt Voter [34] as the underlying voting
approach. Blockchain enhances the level of transparency
as compared to traditional electronic voting system, pri-
marily due to its decentralized nature. It bears the ten-
dency to preclude many conventional ways of fraud which
are very common in the manual or traditional electronic
voting system. Furthermore, it is computationally infeasi-
ble to change any of the blocks, due to the highly complex
formal problem solving required thereby significantly re-
ducing the risk of vote manipulation.
Although blockchain introduces a range of benefits to e-
voting domain, a number of challenges remain as observed
in attempts to conduct blockchain-based e-voting in New
South Wales [27, 28] and Estonia [31]. The challenges
encountered by these voting models within the context
of implementation with blockchain are essentially differ-
ent primarily due to their inherent characteristics such as
voting population, voting methods and logistic considera-
tions. For instance, performance scaling to a large popula-
tion is not a significant concern in boardroom voting where
typical population is less than 20 voters [32], however this
is a significant challenge for public voting model as the
system is expected to take into account large number of
voters with concurrent processing. The volume of voting
population at the blockchain layer is significant as it has
consequences on factors such as number and characteris-
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tics of miners, number and characteristics of validators and
mining process.
3. Related Works
With respect to existing work related to investigating
performance and scalability of blockchain, most of the ef-
forts are focused at cryptocurrency applications of blockchain
such as Bitcoin. A primary reason for this is the compar-
ison with existing online payment systems such as VISA
which have the capability to process 2000 transactions per
second whereas a Bitcoin system can only process 7 trans-
actions per second. A fundamental cause of Bitcoin’s com-
paratively low performance is due to the block generation
rate (currently limited to 10 minutes) and transaction pro-
cessing speed. Therefore, existing efforts have emphasized
enhancing transaction speed of Bitcoin to improve its over-
all scalability thereby facilitating its wider adoption.
One of the leading works in this respect is presented
by Croman et al. [14] where authors investigated practi-
cal limitations in achieving desired performance level with
respect to attributes such as time required to mine a trans-
action into the block of the longest blockchain, processing
rate for number of transactions, time required to download
and run a full copy of blockchain from scratch in order to
participate in the process of transaction validation, costs
incurred due to purchasing, maintaining and working of
resources (such as electricity utilization). The investiga-
tion included taking into account the performance metrics
such as block size, transaction processing speed and block
generation rate for Bitcoin. In order to assess the practi-
cal limitations, experimentation with varying settings with
respect to transaction processing speed were conducted
monitoring effective throughput of the Bitcoin network.
The work presented also acknowledges impact of a scal-
able blockchain on its security i.e. improving scalability
of blockchain can contribute towards limiting opportuni-
ties for forking, transaction malleability attack, and dou-
ble spending thereby improving overall security of the net-
work.
A fundamental concept within Bitcoin network is the
reward for miners for correctly mining transactions lead-
ing to scenarios where greedy miners can affect the overall
transaction processing within the network by prioritizing
transactions with higher transaction fee. In this context,
Karame et al. [35] and Zheng et al. [17] presented efforts to
study the behaviour of mining nodes where greedy nodes
can skew the mining process towards centralization by at-
tempting to utilise their computing power to gain financial
rewards. Specifically, [35] also highlighted interesting rela-
tionship between scalability and security through network
propagation delays. Due to such delays and utilising Bit-
coin network bandwidth, an attacker can cause disruption
to the blockchain by attempting to stop new blocks to the
victim.
Block size is another important factor in determining
the transaction speed within a blockchain network. The
block size within Bitcoin blockchain is currently fixed to 1
MB with maximum 7 transactions allowed per second with
an average one hour required to confirm a transaction. In
order to increase the transaction speed, one approach can
be to increase the size of the block as proposed by Segre-
gated Witness [36]. However as identified by Zheng et al.
[17], if block size is high, it is very likely that the genera-
tion of new blocks will be very slow potentially leading to
forking. This challenge is also highlighted by Zheng et al.
in [16] proposing that if the size of the block is increased
to gather more transactions in the block, this may lead the
network towards centralization as the number of partici-
pants with capabilities to store such volume of data will be
less. Consequently, authors highlight the non-trivial chal-
lenge to achieve a trade-off between transactions process-
ing rate and network latency thereby achieving scalability
without compromising security of the blockchain.
Furthermore, Xu et al. [15] proposed the implementa-
tion of GHOST and Pair-wise ledgers such as R3s Corda24
however there are significant concerns in their adoption
such as availability of data due to the absence of glob-
ally replicated database. In this respect, authors proposed
increasing the number of nodes to run full copy of de-
centralized and trust-less blockchain network in Bitcoin
application to achieve security.
With respect to on-chain solutions to improve scala-
bility of blockchain, Vukoli et al. [37] and Bano et al.
[38] presented a study into the feasibility of available solu-
tions. Specifically, Vukoli et al. [37] presented a compari-
son between two different approaches to achieve consensus
among nodes i.e. Proof of Work (PoW) and Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (BFT) replication targeting their scalabil-
ity constraints. Focusing on Bitcoin blockchain, authors
highlighted block creation rate and block size as key pa-
rameters to improve scalability of bitcoin. An interesting
observation from this effort is that PoW based blockchains
are more scalable in terms of number of nodes by compro-
mising performance unlike BFT based blockchains, how-
ever BFT performs better for smaller number of nodes.
Although the effort identifies new horizons, it requires dis-
cussion on how varying block sizes and block creation rate
may reveal strengths and weaknesses of blockchain in gen-
eral or with respect to an application in particular. Fur-
thermore, Bano et al. [38] focused on the design based
techniques of blockchain proposed to address the challenge
of scalability including Bitcoin-NG [39] and Practical BFT
(PBFT) and Sharding transactions.
Among other efforts, Kim et al. [40] define scalability
as a function of three dimensional parameters; the transac-
tion processing speed, the associated fee, and the volume
for repository of the chain in case of a cryptocurrency ap-
plication. In particular, authors have categorized solutions
to improve scalability into classes i.e. on-chain, off-chain
and side-chain. On-chain solutions include efforts such as
Big Block which increases the block size as adopted by Bit-
coin Unlimited to attain the maximum transmission limit
reducing cost of the transmission. Although, a block can
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contain more transactions however it can increase propa-
gation delay due to high volume of block size which causes
forking. Other on-chain methods discussed include Merke-
lized Abstract Syntax Tree (MAST) [41], recommended in
Bitcoins BIP-114 and Segregated Witness (SegWit) [36].
Off-Chain approaches discussed include Lightning network
where a channel is established between two addresses for
exchange of transaction that uses multi-sign address to cre-
ate stake for both sender and receiver. Channel creation is
an on-chain activity and requires a transaction fee at main
blockchain while exchange of transaction is off-chain and
is not maintained at main blockchain so there is neither a
transaction fee nor a noticeable waiting time. Side-Chain
is another technique for addressing scalability issue where
exchange occurs across blockchain so that different func-
tionalities across blockchains may be brought together to
the blockchain in focus. For instance, using one blockchain
based cryptocurrency into another blockchain based cryp-
tocurrency to use its features. Using this approach, a
Bitcoin can make use of smart contracts on Ethereum
blockchain whereby transactions are valid through such
contracts.
Although most of the research into scalability of blockchain
is focused on Bitcoin, Mattias et al. [42] present an effort
focused on the applications of blockchain technology in
the areas other than cryptocurrency. The authors com-
pare performance of a blockchain network through the
spectrum of security vulnerabilities, the impact of scal-
ability and how these are related to decentralized nature
of blockchain.
The research presented in this paper is focused on the
challenge of investigating performance constraints with re-
spect to scalability of a blockchain. Within our research
our focus is on wider application domains with a special
use case of e-voting and therefore not limited to cryptocur-
rencies such as Bitcoin. The research is aided by rigorous
experimentation to highlight observations which are im-
portant in achieving a scalable solution. In order to ob-
serve the constraints of scalability, we performed experi-
ments and evaluation with respect to number of attributes
of blockchain scalability including block size, block gener-
ation rate, the impact of Proof of Work and non-Proof of
Work based blockchains (public versus private blockchains),
on-chain and off-chain data storage and fetching of the
processed data over the network involving network con-
straints. Our study included large number of transac-
tions submitted parallel from multiple clients aiming to ex-
plore relationship between the capacity of the block to ac-
commodate number of transactions and the rate at which
transactions are processed.
4. A Blockchain based e-Voting System
We have developed a blockchain based e-voting system
for public voting which is also presented at its initial stage
in [33] and illustrated in Fig. 1. In this paper, we present
an overview of our model including interactions between
different entities involved to provide context to the experi-
mentation and analysis. We use our e-voting system as an
example scenario to identify and analyse scalability con-
siderations within a blockchain based system.
Figure 1: A blockchain based e-voting architecture
As presented in Fig. 1, the electoral process requires
certain tasks to be carried out before the voting can be
conducted including offline generation of voter addresses,
generation of candidate addresses, entitling the voters and
candidates to participate in the election process (as per
their specified roles) at designated locations. These ad-
dresses are then used to cast vote from voters to candidate.
The offline activities also involve generation of voter list
and its distribution to individual voting machines which
may specifically be designated for casting votes by the
voters to their desired candidates. As with the real-life
voting systems, the proposed permissioned environment
only allows participants with valid rights such as voter,
candidates or miners. For instance, for a voter, rights are
granted to receive a voting token from vote issuing author-
ity which is consequently sent to their desired candidate.
Similarly, a candidate should be allowed to receive the vot-
ing tokens to their address from voters addresses.
The status of the voting process relies upon a pool of
trusted miners which are responsible for either accepting
a voting transaction by adding it to their newly created
block or can simply reject a transaction preventing it to
become part of the blockchain ledger. In the core polling
day activity, the voters, using the voting machine (located
at the polling station), may cast their vote. The voting
status (whether a vote has been cast successfully or not)
remains unconfirmed until a miner from the mining group
confirms it and updates the ledger of main blockchain. In
this way, an immutable collection of voting records start
to deposit and link in the form of chains of block through
their hashes which may easily be used for counting and
tracking of votes.
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Our proposed e-voting system is successfully deployed
as an e-voting application using Multichain as the blockchain
fabric. The proposed e-voting system achieves the objec-
tive of maintaining secrecy of voting population, verifying
voter entitlement and confidentiality of the vote while fa-
cilitating user in the process of casting vote. The overall
voting process is illustrated in Fig 2.
Figure 2: High-level illustration of the voting process
The voting process starts with the registration of vot-
ers as unique hashes. In terms of blockchain, these are
addresses on blockchain that will be used by these vot-
ers to transfer their votes to the candidates. Each voter
address is assigned a voter token which represents a vote
in the system with a voter address only allocated one to-
ken to avoid duplicate voting. Since the domain of our
research application is voting, the asset here refers to a
vote. Therefore, after creating votes as assets on our pri-
vate blockchain, these voting assets are then allocated to
an address which will act as an authority to transfer the
right of vote (by performing a transaction of moving vot-
ing asset) to the eligible candidates. Using these voter
addresses, a list of registered voters is generated which
is used to segregate voters into different polling stations.
Therefore, each polling station will have its own list of vot-
ers (list of valid blockchain addresses) which will be used
by client voting machines at each polling station. In this
way, as with the current public voting systems in modern
world democracies, only a voter registered to vote at a spe-
cific polling station will be able to cast their voter using
these client voting machines at the polling station.
Furthermore, similar to the contemporary public vot-
ing systems, vote casting activity will be carried out in par-
allel across all designated polling stations simulating sce-
narios where polling stations will have designated e-voting
machines to facilitate voters. In terms of blockchain, the
operation of vote casting is achieved through a blockchain
transaction whereby the voter token is transferred from a
valid voter address to a valid candidate address. In order
to achieve verifiability, a vote can is not successfully cast
unless it is confirmed by one of miners and acknowledged
by all the miners (consensus) to maintain an auditable and
tampered proof list of voting records. Furthermore, when
all the voters are able to cast their votes, the records from
blockchain can be tallied to produce the result of the vote
count against each candidate.
5. Implementation and Experimentation
In order to evaluate our voting model with respect to
both permissionless and permissioned access of blockchain
network, an experimental setup was established as a test
bench. The setup consisted of miners, full blockchain node
containing list of candidates and voters, and a client for
submitting voting transactions to the blockchain node.
The blockchain was implemented using an open source
blockchain platform Multichain using its Alpha 4 version
released in August, 2018. We selected this platform as it
includes new features for handling streams of data which
we plan to use along with voting transactions in the future.
The machines for creating blockchain node and client zone
were running Windows 10 operating systems with Intel
Core i7-7500 CPU processors. This set up was extended
for permissioned blockchain by introducing an additional
connected full node to the master blockchain seed node and
introducing number of Java based remote clients to the
blockchain network facilitating submitting votes in large
numbers from various clients. These Java based remote
clients are capable of communicating to the blockchain
node by accessing Multichains Application Programming
Interface (API) through JSON based Remote Procedure
Call (RPC) client to submit their voting transactions into
the blockchain after being verified by the miners.
The objective of investigation presented in this paper
is to understand the impact of blockchain engine and its
associated attributes on e-voting architecture presented in
the previous section with the view to identify bottlenecks
to achieve optimum performance level. In order to achieve
this objective, a thorough investigation was conducted by
implementing three different scenarios each corresponding
to different voting model settings based on the number
of voters, candidates and the type of client (local vs re-
mote) involved. The first two scenarios were implemented
using a permissionless blockchain with a population of 10
voters where all participants had the privilege to mine the
votes into the blockchain. However, third scenario was im-
plemented as a permissioned blockchain with designated
nodes as miners and validators. This scenario represents a
public voting model where designated bodies are respon-
sible for conducting fair voting process.
Although the experimentation includes both permis-
sioned and permissionless blockchain settings, the parame-
ters monitored through these experiments were: maximum
number of voting transactions a block can contain, average
number of voting transactions a block currently can host,
voting transaction size, maximum transaction processing
speed, and the current operational transaction processing
speed of the system. For instance, if the blockchain genera-
tion rate is not compatible with the overall systems desired
output it may lead to serious performance degradation.
For instance, if block generation rate is too high, there
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Figure 3: Blockchain node specification for permissionless setting
Figure 4: Initial parameter values for permissionless setting
may exist a situation where significant number of transac-
tions keep waiting in the pool of unconfirmed transactions
which can ultimately overflow the volume of memory pool
of node. This situation may cause the blockchain to ei-
ther respond slowly or become non-responsive. Similarly,
in a situation where the blocks are being generated very
quickly, it may affect the blockchain significantly by min-
ing empty blocks without any transactions. This phenom-
ena is very common in private blockchain and therefore an
important challenge to be addressed.
Furthermore, different settings were experimented with
respect to varying values for block size, block creation
rate to identify and highlight significant trade-offs between
block size, block generation rate and total number of vot-
ing transactions per second. Finally, in each of these sce-
narios, transactions were carried out to transfer a vote
from a voters addresses to the candidate addresses. Based
on the output data of these scenarios, response of the
blockchain was recorded and analysed in the form of graphs
analysing transaction mining time and waiting time of a
transaction in the pool.
5.1. Experiments with permissionless setting
Our first setup involved a permissionless blockchain
setting where all participants had the role of a voter and
miner. For this setting, we created a population of 10 vot-
ers with their wallet addresses which represents a voting
scenario with small number of voters such as boardroom.
The experiments for this setting have been carried out on
setup explained in Fig 3. Within this setup, we conducted
experiments with varying configuration for blockchain in-
Figure 5: Voter, Candidate and Transaction hashes for initial exper-
iments
cluding parameters such as block size, block generation
rate and the difficulty of the Proof of Work. Once the chain
was created, it initialized the blockchain with immutable
parameters as detailed in Fig 4 which also presents the
blockchain configuration for two scenarios for permission-
less setting.
Our aim is to investigate the impact of parameters
such as transactions processing per second, transaction
size, maximum and average number of transactions which
can be processed, and average block size on key perfor-
mance indicators. These parameters are critical in iden-
tifying constraints of blockchain process execution with
respect to scalability and consequently on the application
running on blockchain. If the block generation rate is not
compatible with the overall systems desired output, se-
rious performance degradation can be experienced. For
instance, if block generation rate is too high, there may
exist a situation in which too many transactions are kept
waiting in the pool of unconfirmed transactions leading to
overflow of the volume of memory pool of node. This sit-
uation may cause the blockchain to either respond slowly
or even become unresponsive at all. Similarly, in a situa-
tion where the block generation rate is very small, blocks
are being generated very quickly, which may affect the
blockchain by engaging the blockchain into mining empty
block even without having a transaction. Through our
experience, this phenomena is commonly witnessed in pri-
vate blockchain. Therefore, an optimum level is required
to be set to keep a matching condition of equilibrium be-
tween the rate of incoming transactions and the rate at
which the transactions are mined into the new blocks.
Scenario A: For the first scenario within permission-
less blockchain setting, the time interval for adding new
blocks to blockchain was set at 15 seconds i.e. at a reg-
ular interval of 15 seconds, unconfirmed transactions will
be processed, packed and appended to the existing chain
of blocks in the form of a new block. In case of this ex-
periment, the miner has been configured to compute on
average 216 transactions to add its block. Additionally,
the block size is set to 1MB for this experiment. In or-
der to make the blockchain up and running, there were a
total of 60 blocks at the start of the blockchain. A sam-
ple set of voter, candidate and transaction hashes for this
experiment are presented in Fig 5.
Scenario B: Following on from the initial experiments
presented in scenario A, we conducted further experiments
using larger block size, increased block generation rate and
the required amount of bits in Proof of Work was extended
to 32 bits. This implies that on average the miner required
232 hashes to mine a block. These variations in the val-
ues of the parameters significantly affected the overall be-
haviour of the system. Fig 4 shows the parameter values
for the experimentation for scenario B.
Let the arrival time of a transaction Tx to be submit-
ted to unconfirmed pool is represented as Tau, the time
taken by node for adding the transaction to its local wal-
let is represented as Tnw, total time taken for confirma-
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Figure 6: A transaction from voter to candidate
Figure 7: Sample voting transaction details for scenario A
tion of transaction from unconfirmed pool to enter into
blockchain is Tctn and the block size is represented by
Bs. In this respect, Fig 7 presents sample voting trans-
action details for scenario A whereas Fig 8 presents final
candidate votes for scenario A. Similarly, Fig 9 presents
sample voting transaction details and Fig 10 presents the
final candidate votes for scenario B respectively. Further-
more, Fig 6 shows the blockchain output for a transaction
from voter to candidate i.e. simulating casting of a vote
whereas Fig 15 shows blockchain output for specification
of a block containing a transaction. Finally, typical voting
asset within the proposed system is presented in Fig 11.
5.1.1. Analysis and discussion for permissionless setting
Scenario A: Fig. 12.A shows that new transactions
are arriving at different timestamps but are added imme-
diately to the nodes wallet upon arrival. Therefore, as
evident from this figure, there is no delay in the transition
of its journey from pool to blockchain. In order to study
this behaviour in the context of throughput and blockchain
performance (transaction processing speed, maximum num-
ber of transactions per block etc.), it may be considered
that the transaction movement from pool to nodes wal-
let is not a major factor of consideration for the initial
Figure 8: Final candidate votes in their wallet for scenario A
Figure 9: Sample voting transaction details for scenario B
Figure 10: Final candidate votes in their wallet for scenario B
experiments. However, there are some other (although in-
direct) factors such as pool size and number of dependent
transactions which may affect behaviour of this scenario
in blockchain. According to the official documentation of
Multichain blockchain, there is no fixed barrier in limiting
the capacity of the pool but nodes may have constraints in
picking up transactions from other nodes. Another thing
to ponder here is about the dependent transactions such
as multiple transactions from the same node address which
are dependent on each other. In this case, there is a pos-
sibility that the subsequent dependent transactions start
to arrive earlier than its previous transaction on which it
depends. Consequently, in this case, the earlier arrived
transactions cannot be confirmed until its previous trans-
action gets into the block delaying the transaction.
Fig 12.B represents the arrival of voting transactions at
different timestamps into the nodes wallet. These trans-
actions were picked up by the miners to begin the race
of mining those transactions first. Therefore the transac-
tion processing depends primarily upon the Proof of Work
which is performed by the miner while keeping the aver-
age block generation rate constant. An observation from
Fig 12.B is that it is not necessarily important that the
transactions which arrive earlier to the pool, take shorter
time to add to the block even though when the difficulty
is kept constant among all the transactions.
Figure 11: Sample voting asset within blockchain
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Figure 12: A) Time to add unconfirmed transactions from pool to local wallet, B) Time taken by miners to confirm transactions into the
block C) Transaction Mining Time
Figure 13: A) Time to add unconfirmed transactions from pool to local wallet, B) Time taken by miners to confirm transactions into the
block C) Transaction Mining Time
Figure 14: A) Bd−max= 1MB, Max.4k transactions/block, B) Bd−max= 10MB, Max.40k transactions/block, C) Bd−max= 100MB, Max.400k
transactions/block), D) Bd−max= 1000MB, Max.4000k transactions/block
Figure 15: Specification of block containing transaction
In order to evaluate the throughput of the system,
transaction processing speed can be one of the vital factors
to consider. In this context, Fig 12.C demonstrates time
consumed by each voting transaction in the experiment.
Since we have set our target block time to 15 seconds, this
means that each block will be generated at an interval of
15 seconds. This interval is an average time of block gen-
eration which means that if a block is mined much earlier
than the target block time then the rest of the block will
be mined at a rate to restore the average rate of block gen-
eration. The difference in transaction delays is due to the
time taken by the Proof of Work. The difficulty level has
been kept constant throughout all the experiments so that
it may not affect our dataset and we can build a direct
relationship between number of transaction and its pro-
cessing time to check the scalability of the system. The
total amount of time taken by a transaction to be pub-
lished publicly also depends upon its arrival time (in case
of our Multichain platform). For instance, in our experi-
ment where maximum target block time is 15 seconds, a
transaction arrives into a wallet and a block is about to be
9
published within 3 or 4 seconds to keep the average time
of 15 seconds, the transaction (if it does not depend upon
any unconfirmed transaction) will most likely be published
in the main blockchain within those 3 or 4 seconds, pro-
vided the block size does not exceed the maximum size
limit. The situation may be different if the same transac-
tion arrives just moments after the latest block was added.
Scenario B: As is evident from Fig 13.A, the trans-
actions move instantly to nodes wallet upon arrival. An
interesting observation here is that even if the transac-
tions are issued with delay (as it is the case of transaction
number), it has no impact on the time it takes to move
the transaction into wallet. Furthermore, in Fig 13.B, it
can be observed that the transactions are being confirmed
to the same block due to increased block generation rate
which were issued subsequently and also were independent
of each other.
In order to understand the overall outcomes, we con-
sider the Fig 13.B in the context of Fig 13.C. The above
graph shows that the transactions arriving late to system
are unexpectedly being mined earlier than the previous
transaction even though these transactions do not depend
upon each other. We believe primary reason for this oc-
currence is that the new transactions are arriving at a time
when there is some time left for the block to add. Another
interesting point here to note is that not only the block
can contain more transactions but also that in this setting
the work required by the miner is increased significantly
due to Proof of Work been increased to 32 bits.
5.1.2. Scalability analysis for permissionless setting
In order to assess the scalability of the proposed e-
voting system, we first use mathematical formulation to
evaluate the ability of the proposed system to scale. We
represent size of a voting transaction to be represented
by Ts, block generation rate by Bt, maximum amount of
data which can be held by the block B(d−max), and average
block size by B(d−avg). In order to calculate the maximum
number of transactions that can be accommodated by a
block in our system T(s−max) per block and the average
number of transaction T(s−avg) per block, we use standard
metrics defined by Multichain platform. Therefore the size
of the transaction Ts may be obtained by taking arith-
metic sum of all the hexadecimal characters and dividing
the sum by 2 [43]. For scenario A, the transaction size is
250B and with the maximum block size set to 1MB, it can
support up to 4000 transactions in a block. However, an
interesting observation is that with average block size as
516B, the system currently contains an average number of
two transactions per block indicating that the block size is
not used to its full capacity. We believe the reason behind
small number of transactions per block is twofold; i) due
to the small (10) voter population of the current system,
and ii) due to the short block generation rate i.e. 15sec.
Therefore the setup is not able to fully utilize the capacity
of a block resulting in smaller blocks. The above result
can also be confirmed from the blockchain output in Fig
15. However, as indicated above, the system has ability to
scale to a significantly larger population.
The second parameter we are interested in is the trans-
action processing speed of our voting system. Let us as-
sume the number of transactions per second to be repre-
sented by Tn. Mathematically, Tn can be written as
Tn = B(d−max)/Ts/Bt (1)
Substituting the values for block size, transaction size
and block generation rate, we get;
Tn = 1000000/250/15
Therefore, Tn = 266.6 transactions per second.
Through the above calculation, we conclude that the
proposed voting model is capable of supporting transac-
tion speed of upto sixteen thousand voting transactions
per minute which is envisioned to enable the system to
perform effectively for small and medium sized voting en-
vironments. However, as identified in the earlier experi-
ment, this represents capacity of the block and the actual
number of transactions processed may also vary depending
upon the block generation rate.
Similar to above, for scenario B, transaction size is
250B whereas maximum block size B(d−max) is increased
to 1GB to assess the impact of larger block size on the
transaction processing speed. Although the larger block
size has the capacity to accommodate up to 4000000 trans-
actions for each block however our experimentation has
revealed the average block size B(d−avg) to be 5468B. In-
terestingly, this represents a 10-times increase compared
to the average block size for scenario A and therefore in-
dicates a directly proportional relationship between the
maximum block size and average block size. Furthermore,
Bt has been set to 60 seconds and number of required bits
for Proof of Work has been set to 32 bits increasing the
difficulty level. However, average transactions per block
in this case are recorded to be 21 which is again a 10-
times increase on the scenario A. Analysing the values of
T(s−max/block) and T(s−avg/block) , it can be seen that by
increasing the block size the number of transactions that
can be handled by a block has increased however increas-
ing the block generation rate and difficulty level of Proof of
Work did not have significant adverse impact. We present
graphical analysis of this relationship in Fig 14. Therefore,
we conclude that block generation rate and block size af-
fect the rate at which transactions arrive to pool and the
rate at which these transaction are confirmed to the block.
5.2. Experimentation with permissioned setting
For this phase of experimentation, the setup consisted
of miners, full blockchain node containing list of candi-
dates and voters, and a client for submitting voting trans-
actions to the blockchain node. These machines for creat-
ing blockchain node and client zone are running Windows
10 operating systems over intel Core i7-7500 CPU proces-
sors. Additionally, we introduced a full node connected
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to the master blockchain seed node and a number of Java
based remote clients to the blockchain network to facili-
tate large number of voters on various clients. The setup
is summarized in Fig 16.
The permissioned blockchain was created with 100,000
voters and designated nodes as miners and observers to
simulate a conventional public voting environment. The
parameters monitored through these experiments were; max-
imum number of voting transactions a block can contain,
average number of voting transactions a block can host,
voting transaction size, maximum transaction processing
speed, and the operational transaction processing speed of
the system.
Furthermore, the blockchain setting for these experi-
ments is non-Proof of Work and instead uses mining di-
versity and mining turnover parameters provided by Mul-
tichain platform to achieve consensus. Specifically, mining
diversity defines the proportion of mining power which is
necessary to run blockchain properly. For these experi-
ments, mining diversity is set to 0.3. Therefore the min-
imum number of miners required to run the blockchain
successfully will be obtained by multiplying the value of
mining diversity to the number of miners and then round
the output to the closest integer. In our case, this value is
found to be value is 3 as the total number of miners which
are involved in running the public voting model is 10 as
it is shown in Fig. 16. This implies that at least three
out of ten miners will have to actively participate in the
process of adding a new block to the transaction. Addi-
tionally, mining turnover sets up the scheduling of miners
to get their turns in rotation using a round robin scheme.
The value of mining turnover lies between 0 and 1 with
a value of 1 implying that every miner will be looking to
add a block to the blockchain which may create forks and
potentially unnecessary computational tasks. Similarly if
the value is set to 0, then a default round robin scheduling
algorithm will be followed. For the current experimenta-
tion settings, the value has been set to 0.5 to achieve a
balance between these two extremes. Consequently, Proof
of Work is not required by the miners to get their turn and
add the proposed block into the blockchain.
Within this setup, voter rights are granted to receive a
single voting token from vote issuing authority and send
this voting token to their desired candidate. Similarly, a
candidate should be allowed to receive the voting tokens
to their address which are expected to be received from
voters’ addresses. The process in this setup relies upon
a pool of trusted miners responsible to either accepting
a voting transaction by adding it to their newly created
block or reject a transaction restricting it to become a
part of the ledger.
The experimentation was divided into three different
cases based on varying number of concurrent clients. Specif-
ically, we evaluated our e-voting system with one, two
and seven concurrent clients where these clients were lo-
cated on a remote machine thereby taking into account
network bandwidth and delay. As with the real-life pub-
Figure 16: System specification for e-voting architecture
Figure 17: Blockchain setup for experimentation
lic voting system, the proposed system is implemented as
a permissioned and controlled environment so that only
designated nodes are able to construct and commit vot-
ing transactions simulating the role of a polling station
in real-life systems. Fig 17 and Fig 18.A present specifica-
tions of blockchain master node used for these experiments
whereas Fig 18.B presents a sample voting asset within the
proposed e-voting system.
Figure 18: Experimentation specification for permissioned
blockchain
5.2.1. Scalability analysis for permissioned setting
Our experimentation with permissioned blockchain in-
volved three different settings varying based on the number
of concurrent clients involved i.e. one, two and seven con-
current clients to conduct voting transactions. We present
analysis of the results obtained below.
Experiments with one client: Fig. 19 demonstrates
peak performance in terms of transaction processing speed
when nine thousand voting transactions were cast from one
client to the blockchain master node. At this stage, the
system was operating at a frequency of 23.01 transactions
per second i.e. in this case, a single voting transaction
took 0.043 seconds to be mined. In order to understand
its implications with respect to scalability of blockchain,
block size and its generation rate have a profound role. For
instance, if a transaction arrives shortly before a block is
about to mine, it is likely that it will be mined to the block
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Figure 19: Tx processing speed vs number of Tx for one client
which is about to be added to the longest blockchain. Sim-
ilarly, if the transaction arrives after the latest block has
been added to the main blockchain, this transaction will
have to wait until a miner mines it to the next block af-
ter the average block generation time (fifteen seconds in
this case). The impact of block generation rate can in-
crease when the transactions are constructed and commit-
ted from multiple remote concurrent clients with network
latency also a factor. However, the general trend shown
in Fig 19 is that the proposed e-voting system shows no
limitations with respect to scalability in this case. Even
in the worst case, when transaction speed is 12.71 trans-
actions per second, the e-voting system looks to be in a
very stable state and hence shows strength with respect to
scalability. Another important observation is that this ex-
perimentation was conducted using a non-Proof of Work
based permissioned blockchain where we have a pool of
trusted and designated miners. Therefore the system suits
real mode of transaction validation in this context and it
does not introduce disadvantage of over utilization of elec-
tric and computational power.
Experiments with two concurrent clients: The
second set of experiments involved two concurrent voting
clients with one local client and the other interacting with
the e-voting application remotely through a programmable
interface. Since the additional remote client is concur-
rently running on the network, the network latency has a
considerable impact as can be observed from the graph in
Fig 20 which represents the average transaction execution
time. Both clients started with the same number of vot-
ers and their voting transactions were being processed by
the blockchain node with almost same frequency. Later
on, due to potential network latency, transactions started
to arrive late from the remote client. In this case, empty
blocks are mined by the blockchain (Multichain and many
other private blockchain platforms use this mechanism to
keep the blockchain live while operating at a pre-set block
generation rate ). This happens in case if no transaction
is being sent from any client (we did not observe this to be
the case for our experiments). Another interesting possi-
bility can be that the mining nodes picked up transactions
which were coming from the first block, in that case the
transaction hashes for first client transactions should be
present more in the block which caused delay for process-
ing transactions of the remote client. By examining the
data at the blockchain, it was obvious that the miner at
that moment picked up mostly the transaction from first
client while the second client transactions were supposed
to gather at the pool of unconfirmed transactions.
Experiments with seven concurrent clients: The
third setting attempts to execute a public voting model
simulating a real world scenario where overall 222,000 trans-
actions were sent from seven different voting clients run-
ning concurrently across different remote locations. This
scenario introduced a number of factors including network
latency, block generation rate, block size, increased work-
load on blockchain master and connected node that caused
variation in response time.
As is evident from Fig 21, a fluctuation can be observed in
the processing speed of voting transactions. Furthermore,
as in the previous scenarios, this speed is calculated by
considering maximum execution time which is taken by an
individual client. The execution time of individual client
to process same number of transactions is presented in
Fig 21.A. Here, due to network latency and bulk transac-
tion load on blockchain node, there may arrive a situation
where bulk transactions which are generated by seven dif-
ferent clients may increase memory pool size of blockchain
node in such a way that the incoming flux of transaction
does not synchronize effectively with the transaction min-
ing process resulting in a mismatch between these two pro-
cesses. Therefore, execution time of some clients is greater
than the others. However, the system demonstrates to be
scalable as the average time taken by an individual trans-
action is around 0.10 second which should be healthy for
a voting process to carry on.
Summarizing the evaluation we have conducted with
permissioned blockchain, we have observed that with the
increase in number of concurrent clients, the workload for
the blockchain master node increases which may result in
delays in transactions committed to the blockchain. Fig
22 shows a comparison of systems throughput in terms of
number of transactions which are processed by an indi-
vidual client when conducted for case 1, 2, and 3. Com-
paring case 1 with 2 and 3 in Fig 22, it can be inferred
that executing multiple clients in parallel over the network
has a noticeable impact on the performance of blockchain.
We have also observed the trade-off represented by block
generation rate and block size and their significance to
achieve a scalable solution. Furthermore, an interesting
observation is the delay caused due to network connectiv-
ity. For instance, analysing the case where six thousand
voting transactions were executed from a client, the trans-
action processing speed is almost similar in case 2 and
3 however when the same number of transactions are exe-
cuted in case 1, the transactions processing speed is almost
double which we believe is due to the absence of network
delay.
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Figure 20: Experimentation with two clients: A) Avg. Tx processing speed, B) Tx processing time
Figure 21: Experimentation with seven remote clients: A) Avg. Tx processing speed, B) Tx processing time
Figure 22: Comparative summary of Tx speed for case 1, 2 and 3
6. Conclusion
Blockchain is a disruptive technology and has attracted
significant attention with prominent applications across di-
verse application domains including supply chain manage-
ment, gaming, healthcare, real estate and finance. Elec-
tronic or e-voting is one of the emerging applications of
blockchain where researchers have proposed to leverage
blockchain capabilities to achieve integrity, anonymity and
non-repudiation which are critical for a voting applica-
tion. Current research into scalability and performance
of blockchain is focused on Bitcoin with the objective to
achieve comparable performance as of existing online pay-
ment systems such as VISA. However, there exists a gap in
literature with respect to investigating performance con-
straints for wider application domains. In this paper, we
have presented our efforts to address this gap by conduct-
ing an in-depth investigation of parameters which have a
profound role in achieving scalable solutions using blockchain.
Specifically, we investigate the role of block generation
rate, block size, transaction processing rate and transac-
tion size with respect to scalability of blockchain based so-
lution. Our experimentation results highlight a trade-off
between these parameters and identify avenues to explore
for further research.
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